>[!INFO] Causation >The link between the conduct of the accused and it's consequence. In other words, did the act or omission of the accused cause the injury or death of the victim. Causation is a **question of fact.** In Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1918] AC 350; [1918-19] All ER Rep 443 (HL) Lord Shaw said (at 369; 453): - Causation is not a 'chain' but rather a *net*. - Influences, forces, events, precedent and other facts meet and radiate from each other. In Jones v Great Western Railway Co [1930] 144 LT 194; [1930] All ER Ext 830 (HL) Lord Macmillan, in dissent on other matters, said (at 202; 842): - Causation is usually a matter of inference. - Where the coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual observation, we can legitimately make an inference from the facts. In R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35: - The accused stabbed the victim in a barrack room brawl. - Both parties were soldiers. - The victim had a punctured lung. - On the way to the medico's, the victim was dropped twice. He then recieved treatment. - It was submitted that the fall may have caused the issues in his recovery. - Lord Park CJ at 42-43 provided that if at the time of death, the original wound is still an operating cause and a substantial cause, then the death can be properly be said to be as of a result to that wound, albeit that some other cause of death is also operating. In Karkouer v Western Australia (2006) 161 A Crim R 347; a co-accused hit the victim with a mallet under the chin. That would cause death. The applicant had hit the victim on the back of the head causing multiple skull fractures. The applicant was convicted of murder and his appeal failed. Steytler P said at 359: - In the end, it seems to me that, on the present state of authority, it is enough to satisfy the requirement of causation for the purpose of attributing criminal responsibility if the *act of the accused makes a significant contribution to the death of the victim, whether by accelerating the victim's death or otherwise*, and that it is for the jury to decide whether or not the connection is sufficiently substantial. In Royall v The Queen (1991) 172 CLR 378; 54 A Crim R 53; 100 ALR 669 McHugh J was alone in finding the trial judge's directions to the jury defective. He would have applied the proviso. His Honour said (at 440; 714; 99): - In criminal cases, the common law has also refused to apply the “but for” test as the sole test of causation. Nevertheless, the “but for” test is a useful tool in criminal law for determining whether a causal link existed between an accused's act or omission and the relevant injury or damage. But before a person will be held criminally liable for his or her act or omission, the causal link between that act or omission and the injury or damage must be sufficiently cogent to justify attributing causal responsibility, ie legal responsibility, to that person - Novus Actus Interveniens is when a *new act intervenes*, referring to the intervention of a human activity between the accused's act and ultimate consequence of the victim. - This breaks the chain of causation. - Examples include: - R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279: the accused fired at police and used his pregnant girlfriend as a shield to prevent arrest. Police shot and killed her. The accused was convicted of manslaughter and his appeal dismissed. - Gillet v The Queen (2006) 166 A Crim R 419: the appellant had an epileptic fit while driving. The driving caused death. Appeal dismissed. Apellant had seizures earlier. Novus actus interveniens appeal rejected. - Little v Police (SA) [2017] SASCFC 8: Argument that dangerous driving by the victim of a culpable driving charge constituted a novus actus interveniens was rejected.