# The Principles Self-defence is typically lead on the basis of: - The accused defended themselves from an attack; or - The accused was defending their property; or - The accused was protecting another person being attacked. It is governed in Victoria under [[Section 322K Self-defence]] of the Crimes Act 1958. Common law self-defence was abolished. # Leading Authorities ## Edmunds v The King [2025] VSCA 31 At [211] to [214]: >This brings us to our fourth (albeit related) observation: self-defence cannot be used as a pretext to carry out a criminal purpose.[53] >If a person kills in pursuit of an original criminal design to commit murder, it could hardly be said the person acted in self-defence. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how they could have responded to the conduct of the victim and formed the belief that it was necessary to engage in the fatal act to defend themselves from the risk of death or really serious injury. >Certainly, the justificatory or exculpatory effect of self-defence[54] would be entirely subverted if it could be invoked by a person who planned and fully intended to harm the victim in a particular way and succeeded in doing precisely that, and so acted irrespective of any action taken by the victim. ## Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645  [_Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions_ (1987) 162 CLR 645; 61 ALJR 375; 25 A Crim R 163; 71 ALR 641](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1987180337&pubNum=0003586&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)).  - The accused killed his neighbour after an argument about the neighbour leaving security gates open and parking his car outside the garage.  - The accused argued that he believed the victim had a knife and that he might have a shotgun in his car.  - The accused ran into his unit after the initial altercation, got his gun, went outside and shot the neighbour.  - At the accused's murder trial, the judge withdrew the issue of self-defence and he was convicted.  - The matter was appealed to the High Court. All 7 justices allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial. Justices Wilson, Dawson and Toohey said: > The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he [or she] did. If he [or she] had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he [or she] is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. # The Two-Limb Test A self-defence argument must satisfy two limbs: 1. The accused had a *belief in necessity* of his actions; and 2. The accused had a *reasonable response*. ## Belief in Necessity This test is a #subjective test. - It does not matter if the belief was mistaken but genuinely held by the accused.[^1] - If the accused was *intoxicated* (alcohol/drugs), it can be taken into account about the beliefs they held at the time.[^2] - Weight must be given to a person reacting instantly to imminent danger being unable to precisely measure the action required[^10]. ## Reasonable Response This test is a mixture of #subjective and #objective. First, the accused must have reasonable believe that the force that they utilised was necessary in self-defence. This component is #subjective. Second, the belief that the accused held must be *reasonable*. This component is objectively assessed based on: - The surrounding circumstances[^3]; and - All the facts within the accused's knowledge[^3]; and - The prior conduct of the victim[^4]; and - The relationship between the parties involved[^5]; and - Any delusional beliefs the accused held[^6]; and - Any excitement, affront or distress experienced by the accused[^7]; and - The accused's failure to retreat[^8]. Whilst there is no direct need for the accused to have retreated, it is still something which can be considered in assessing whether or not the accused's conduct was a reasonable response[^9]. In DPP v Arslanian [2022] VSC 736 at [378], the reasonable limb was set out as: >[!QUOTE] DPP v Arslanian >The question of whether an accused's conduct was a “reasonable response” is an objective test; however, it must be considered in light of the circumstances as subjectively perceived by the accused. The relevant determination is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the accused's conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances as they perceived them.[623] As the fact finder is required to assess the response of the accused (and not of a reasonable person), personal attributes including, for example, the accused's age, gender and state of health as well as the surrounding physical circumstances are relevant.[624] The reasonableness of the response should also be assessed in terms of the objective proportionality of the conduct to the perceived situation, although again this must be determined against the circumstances as the accused perceived them.[625] [^1]: R v McKay [1957] VR 560; R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613; R v Trevenna [2004] NSWCCA 43 [^2]: R v Conlon (1993) 69 A Crim R 92 (NSWSC); R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613. [^3]: [R v Wills [1983] 2 VR 201](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1983167686&pubNum=0004888&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)&comp=wlau) at 212 per Lush J. [^4]: [R v Keith [1934] St R Qd 155](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1934028172&pubNum=0004825&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)&comp=wlau) at 177, per Webb J; adopted in [R v Muratovic [1967] Qd R 15](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1967076417&pubNum=0005143&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 30, per Hart J. [^5]: [R v Hector [1953] VLR 543](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1953043001&pubNum=0004887&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)). [^6]: R v Grosser (1999) SASR 584; [[1999] SASC 302](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&normalizedCite=1999SASCAU302&pubNum=0006086&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)). [^7]: [R v Wills [1983] 2 VR 201](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1983167686&pubNum=0004888&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 211, per Lush J; [_R v Dziduch_ (1990) 47 A Crim R 378](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1990341363&pubNum=0005341&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 380, per Hunt J; [R v Johnson [1964] Qd R 1](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1964055918&pubNum=0005143&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 13–14, per Stanley J. [^8]: [Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (1987) 162 CLR 645](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1987180337&pubNum=0003586&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 663 per Mason CJ. [^9]: [_Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions_ (1987) 162 CLR 645; 61 ALJR 375; 25 A Crim R 163; 71 ALR 641](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1987180337&pubNum=0003586&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 663 (CLR), per Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ; [_Viro v The Queen_ (1978) 141 CLR 88; 52 ALJR 418; 18 ALR 257](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1978151325&pubNum=0003586&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 115–116 (CLR), per Gibbs J; [_R v Howe_ (1958) 100 CLR 448; 32 ALJR 212](https://anzlaw.thomsonreuters.com/Link/Document/FullText?refType=U2&serNum=1958052075&pubNum=0003586&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&ppcid=2df33b0aee15432c9879d8874fd24b8f&contextData=\(sc.Keycite\)) at 462–464 (CLR), per Dixon CJ. [^10]: R v Palmer [1971] AC 814; Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions (1987) 162 CLR 645; R v Conlon (1993) 69 A Crim R 92).